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Notes
Boyle, 1987, p. 87; cf. Trabert, 1953; Regenbogen, 1961, p. 432-442; Liebermann, 1974, p. 86-95.
English translations are adapted from Fitch, 2002-2004.
So (e.g.) Tarrant, 1985, p. 47, 152 (ad Thy. 420); Giancotti, 1986, p. 33-36; Monteleone, 1991, p. 241-243; and most recently Marchetta, 2010, p. 65-88, 185-190.
See, most recently, Fitch and McElduff, 2002.
Choice and failure of will are also attracting more attention in the recent philosophical and psychological literature, e.g. Mele, 1987 and 2001; Holton, 2009; Salecl, 2010.
Inwood, 2000; and further Zöller, 2003; Fuhrer, 2010.
Maltz, 1960, p. v, and Sommer, 2000, p. 151 respectively.
Fischer, 2008, p. 69-73 offers a review of the debate, with some earlier literature, to which add also: (positive interpretation of Hercules) Anliker, 1960, p. 45-51; Caviglia, 1979, p. 13-83; Lawall, 1983; Grimal, 1986; Motto and Clark, 1988, p. 261-294; Viansino, 2007, p. 100-120; (negative interpretation) Giancotti, 1953, p. 129-142; Seidensticker, 1969, p. 109-119; Braden, 1970, p. 23-25; Pettine, 1974, p. 61-128; Timpanaro, 1981, p. 113-130; Pratt, 1983, p. 115-121, 127; Boyle, 1997, p. 106-111 (“a dramatic critique of the central Roman value, uirtus”, p. 106); Palmieri, 1999, p. 131-149. My own view is that Hercules is conceived as victim of Juno, who misrepresents his intentions and inflicts madness externally, but that accusations of hybris are questionable and that the heroic self-representation of the uir magnus is justified (cf. Heldmann, 1974, p. 56); for reasons set out below I hesitate to read the final scene as quasi-philosophical allegory.
E.g. Seidensticker, 1969, p. 117-118; Zintzen, 1972, p. 205-206; Shelton, 1978, p. 68-70; Wellmann-Bretzigheimer, 1978, p. 127-127; Boyle, 1997, p. 110. Multiple thematic ironies and responsions in the final act are noted by Seidensticker, 1969, p. 115-119; Caviglia, 1979, p. 62-64; Lawall, 1983, p. 21-23; Motto and Clark, 1988, p. 286-293.
Braden, 1993, p. 245-249.
Cuncta iam amisi bona, / mentem a r m a f a m a m coniugem natos m a n u s, / etiam furorem. nemo polluto queat / animo mederi: morte sanandum est scelus (1259-1262).
Further Bertoli, 1986, p. 75-81.
Cf. Seidensticker, 1969, p. 95-97; Braden, 1970, p. 16-17; Shelton, 1979, p. 65-66; Segal, 1982; Petrone, 1988, p. 61-66; Fitch and McElduff, 2002, p. 24-27.
Monstrum impium saeuumque et immite ac ferum (1280) ; agedum, dextra, conare aggredi / ingens opus, labore bis seno amplius (1281-1282). Cf. Fitch, 1987, p. 443 (ad loc.): “Once again Hercules is reducing the situation to the formula of the labors”.
E.g. manus (58, 114, 122, 247, 469, 566, 614-615, 918-919, 1103), dextera (800, 895, 989, 1011, 1281), lacerti (225, 1102), umeri (71, 624-625); and note also the adjectives audaces manus (247), notas manus (469), manantes ... / manus cruenta caede (918-919), uictrice dextera (800), ultrice dextra (895). Boyle, 1997, p. 106 well remarks that “uirtus is dramatised pervasively in this play as ‘manliness’ or ‘valour’ in its crudest and most popular sense, namely physical prowess and power, independent of any intellectual or moral quality ... Indeed for Hercules ... uirtus is intimately bound to physical force, to what his ‘hands’ can do. The words manus ... and dextra ... dominate the linguistic texture of this play as of no other”. Typical verbs for Herculean activity include rumpere and compounds (57, 237, 280, 287, 290, 566, 1000), effringere (47), diruere (283), scindere (285) and euertere (998).
Succurre, genitor; siue te pietas mouet / ... siue uiolatum decus u i r t u t i s. effer arma (1269-1271); surge et aduersa i m p e t u / perfringe s o l i t o. nunc tuum nulli imparem / animum malo r e s u m e, nunc magna tibi / u i r t u t e agendum est: Herculem irasci ueta (1274-1277).
S u c c u m b e , uirtus, p e r f e r imperium patris. / eat ad labores hic quoque Herculeos labor: /
u i u a m u s (1315-1317). On the typology of the “approbation explicite”, see Aygon in this volume.
To that extent Juno’s prediction was correct (though in a way she did not realize): quaeris Alcidae parem? / nemo est nisi ipse (84-85).
See Maltz, 1960, p. 33-34.
Bella iam secum gerat (85); et cupiat mori / ab inferis reuersus (116-117); miserum ueta perire, felicem iube (513). Braden, 1993, p. 257 well remarks that “Amphitryon has unwittingly applied Lycus’ calculus of cruelty: miserum ueta perire, felicem iube ... Hercules’ hell has not been alleviated but made more conclusive”.
E.g. Pratt, 1983, p. 121: “The father’s desolation brings Hercules to new insights ... Thus Hercules moves from audacity, violence, madness, and egoism to rationality and altruism ...”; similarly Seidensticker, 1969, p. 118; Galinsky, 1972, p. 173; Shelton, 1978, p. 69; Caviglia, 1979, p. 61-62; Lawall, 1983, p. 15-26, esp. 21 and 23; Zwierlein, 1984, p. 29.
Thus Fitch, 1979, p. 247; Timpanaro, 1981, p. 123-124; Palmieri, 1999, p. 131-132, 143-144. With Amphitryon’s gesture and its effect, compare the analogous operatics of Anchises at Verg., Aen. II, 644-649.
Ecce iam facies scelus / uolens sciensque (1300-1301) ; sic statue, quidquid statuis, ut causam tuam / famamque in arto stare et ancipiti scias : / aut uiuis aut occidis (1306-1308). Cf. Fitch, 1979, p. 244-245; 1987, p. 35-38. As Braden, 1993, p. 255 paraphrases: “That is, if you do not decide to live, I will see to it that you are remembered as the murderer of your father ... [Hercules] bows to the evidence that Amphitryon holds dangerous power over his posthumous reputation”.
Praeter haec adhuc inuenies genus aliud hominum ... eorum, qui cogi ad rectum compellique possunt, quibus non duce tantum opus sit, sed adiutore et, ut ita dicam, coactore (Ep. 52, 4).
Ubique notus perdidi exilio locum (1331) ; senectae parce desertae, precor, / annisque fessis (1249-1250).
Cf. Anliker, 1960, p. 91; Pettine, 1974, p. 106-110; Timpanaro, 1981, p. 124; Palmieri, 1999, p. 147-148. So far from having won an inner “victory over himself” (e.g. Giancotti, 1953, p. 142; Seidensticker, 1969, p. 118; Caviglia, 1979, p. 82; Motto and Clark, 1988, p. 286), Hercules remains a “prisoner of himself”, condemned in perpetuity (Pettine, 1974, p. 108).
The only time the blind man “sees” is when he hallucinates: nata, genitorem uides? / ego uideo (43-44).
Cf. Mader, 2010, p. 293-295.
Desere infaustum patrem. / in recta quid deflectis errantem gradum? / permitte labi; melius inueniam uiam, / quam quaero, solus, quae me ab hac uita extrahat (3-5). With deflectis errantem gradum (4) compare Antigone’s later sed flecte mentem (77): changing direction and changing the mind are isomorphic phenomena.
Quid me, nata, pestifero tenes / amore uinctum? quid tenes?, (38-39); uis nulla, genitor, a tuo nostram manum / corpore resoluet, nemo me comitem tibi / eripiet umquam, (51-53); castam manum, (222). With reference to Antigone, manus signifies filial devotion; in the case of Oedipus, it is a constant reminder of his horrendous past (8, 91-93, 154-155, 173, 217).
So also the oxymoron peccas honesta mente, pietatem uocas / patrem insepultum trahere (97-98), again in reference to Antigone’s piety.
Genitor uocat. / sequor, sequor, (39-40). The conjunctions ducere/sequi, nolle/uelle and resultant anguish of the reluctant subject ironically echo Seneca’s paraphrase of Cleanthes’ hymn: duc, o parens celsique dominator poli, / quocumque placuit: nulla parendi mora est; / adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens / malusque patiar, facere quod licuit bono. / ducunt uolentem fata, nolentem trahunt, “Lead me, father and master of lofty heaven, wherever you wish. I obey without hesitation, I am ready and eager. And if I am unwilling, still shall I follow groaning, and suffer in my wickedness what I might have done as a good man. For the fates lead the willing, but drag the unwilling along” (Ep. 107, 11). Antigone plays the higher power, while Oedipus’ reluctant acceptance of her leadership is less a case of the uolens following than the nolens being dragged—here a paradoxical unwilling willingness.
Cf. the “therapeutic” persistence at Ep. 89, 19: remedia ante uultis quam uitia desinere? ego uero eo magis dicam et, quia recusatis, perseuerabo ... dicam etiam inuitis profutura, “Do you want my remedies to stop before your vices? I shall indeed speak of them all the more and persevere because you object ... I shall speak words that will help men even against their will”.
Quid perdis ultra uerba ? quid pectus ferum / mollire temptas precibus ? (140-141) ; quid prece indomitum domas ? / unum hoc habet fortuna quo possim capi / inuictus aliis ; sola tu affectus potes / mollire duros (307‑310). The “softening” that leads Oedipus to repudiate death (mollire duros, 310) reverses his earlier wish for a fiery death (pectusque soluam durum et in cinerem dabo / hoc quidquid in me uiuit, 113-114).
Iubente te uel uiuet (319). The effect of the aprosdoketon is heightened by triple anaphora on iubente te and by the dramatic pause after the half-verse 319: “Edipo rimane come attonito sotto il peso di qual doloroso assenso” (Marchetta, 2010, p. 71).
Compare Anchises’ rhetoric of submission in Vergil, when the obstinate senex abandons his death-wish and submits to a higher will: iam iam nulla mora est; s e q u o r et qua d u c i t i s adsum, / di patrii ... / c e d o equidem n e c, nate, tibi comes ire r e c u s o, “No more delay now; now I follow, and wherever you lead, O gods of my fathers, there I am ... I yield and do not refuse to go with you, my son, as your companion” (Aen. II, 701-704). As with Oedipus, ducere/sequi implies moral propriety (Hor., Epist. I, 10, 47-48 ; Sen., Ben. VI, 43, 3 ; Prou. 5, 4).
Pectus antiquum aduoca (77) ; parens magnanime (182) ; nata, quid genibus meis / fles aduoluta ? (306-307). Oedipus is “vinto ma non convinto” (Marchetta, 2010, p. 70).
Discede a patre, / discede uirgo. timeo post matrem omnia (49-50). Further Mader, 2010, p. 305-307. Situated just before the amatory topoi, the juxtaposition sola tu affectus potes / m o l l i r e d u r o s (310) perhaps recalls the distinctive mollis/durus opposition of elegiac poetics, as (e.g.) Prop. 1.7, with Stroh, 1971, p. 18-20: another pointer, perhaps, to the (subconscious) erotic turn Oedipus’ rhetoric is taking.
Cf. Petrone, 1988-1989, p. 252-255; Mader, 2010, p. 307-308.
Iuuat excitatas consequi cursu feras / et rigida molli gaesa iaculari manu (110-111) ; Thesea coniunx, clara progenies Iouis, / n e f a n d o c a s t o pectore exturba ocius (129-130) ; expelle facinus mente castifica horridum (169).
Literary precedents include Eur., Hipp. 380-381, τὰ χρήστ’ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ γιγνώσκομεν, / οὐκ ἐκπονοῦμεν δ’, “We understand and we can discern what is right, but don’t accomplish it”; Med. 1078-1078, καὶ μανθάνω μὲν οἷα δρᾶν μέλλω κακά, / θυμὸς δὲ κρείσσων τῶν ἐμῶν βουλευμάτων, “And I understand what terrible crimes I am about to commit, but passion overrules my resolutions”; Ov., Met. VII, 17-21, excute uirgineo conceptas pectore flammas, / si potes, infelix. si possem, sanior essem; / sed trahit inuitam noua uis, aliudque cupido, / mens aliud suadet; uideo meliora proboque, / deteriora sequor, “Dash out the flames kindled within your virgin breast, if you can, unhappy one! If I could, I would be better off. But some strange force drags me against my will, and desire persuades me to do one thing, the mind another. I see and approve of the better course, but follow the worse”; with Liebermann, 1974, p. 86-89; Pettine, 1974, p. 172-173; Binroth-Bank, 1997; Auhagen, 1999, p. 131-156; Nugent, 2008. On Phaedra’s self-analytical clarity Lefèvre, 1969, p. 149 (= 1972, p. 363) remarks, “Diese Einsicht in das Fehlen ist für Senecas dramatisches Werk durchaus ungewöhnlich, da der Stoiker das Unterliegen unter die Affekte zumeist mit der Blindheit der Menschen in Verbindung brachte, wie es bei Theseus, Hippolytus oder Agamemnon der Fall ist”.
Cf. Liebermann, 1974, p. 87-88; Calabrese, 2009, p. 32-33. On the imagery of indecision, see Heldmann, 1974, p. 136; Tietze Larson, 1987 and 1994, p. 29, 99-100; and esp. Aygon, 2004, p. 95-101. Since the tertium comparationis is control, the nautical simile is also reversible: at 181-185 it indexes Phaedra’s loss of control, later it dramatizes Hippolytus’ skillful (but futile) attempt to assert control over his stampeding horses: at ille, qualis turbido rector mari / ratem retentat, ne det obliquum latus, / et arte fluctum fallit, haud aliter citos / currus gubernat, “But as a helmsman holds a ship steady in a stormy sea, lest it turn broadside, and cheats the wave with his skill, just so he steers the speeding chariot” (1072-1075).
Vicit ac regnat furor, / potensque tota mente dominatur d e u s (184-185); hic uolucer omni pollet in terra impotens (186-194); with Heldmann, 1974, p. 137-144. For the spurious self-justification, cf. Helen’s argument at Hom., Od. IV, 259-264 ; Eur., Tr. 981-991.
Honesta primum est u e l l e nec labi uia, / pudor est secundus n o s s e peccandi modum (140-141) ; pars sanitatis u e l l e sanari fuit (249).
Cf. Heldmann, 1974, p. 130. Velle and uoluntas: pars magna bonitatis est uelle fieri bonum, “The greater part of goodness is the will to become good” ( Ep. 34, 3); magna pars est profectus uelle proficere, “The greater part of progress is the will to progress” (71, 36); quid tibi opus est ut bonus sis? uelle, “What do you need to be good? To want it” (80, 4); actio recta non erit, nisi recta fuerit uoluntas, ab hac enim est actio. rursus uoluntas non erit recta, nisi habitus animi rectus fuerit, ab hoc enim est uoluntas, “Conduct will not be right unless the will is right, for this is the source of conduct. Nor again can the will be right unless the attitude of mind is right, for this is the source of the will” (95, 57); with discussion in Inwood, 2000, p. 137-142; Zöller, 2003; Fuhrer, 2010.
Maius est monstro nefas: / nam monstra f a t o, m o r i b u s scelera imputes (143-144). On the tension fate/responsibility, see Heldmann, 1974, p. 131-132; Giancotti, 1986, p. 19-36. The pairing appears again in the nurse’s appeal to Hipploytus: quem fata cogunt, ille cum uenia est miser;/ at si quis ultro se malis offert uolens / seque ipse torquet, perdere est dignus bona / quis nescit uti, “A person coerced by fate may be forgiven for being unhappy. But if someone willingly volunteers for suffering and torments himself, he deserves to lose the good things he is incapable of using” (440-443).
As (e.g.) Prou. 2, 4, non quid, sed quemadmodum feras, interest, “Not what you endure, but how you endure, is important”; further Lefèvre, 1966 and 1973.
Quid poena praesens, conscius mentis pauor / animusque culpa plenus et semet timens ? (162-163).
Aude, anime, tempta, perage mandatum tuum. / intrepida constent uerba... / ...en, incipe, anime ! (592-599)
Cf. Biondi, 1989, p. 67, “La uoluntas della passione (quod uolo) che la precipita verso il crimen della confessione d’amore a Ippolito, e la uoluntas della ratio (me nolle) che la riscatterà fino alla confessione della colpa a Teseo” ; Calabrese, 2009, p. 59-60 ; Marchetta, 2010, p. 71-80, “il conflitto fra il uelle del furor e il nolle della bona mens” (79) ; Fuhrer, 2010, p. 79, “Die Volition des nolle ist durch ihre moralischen Skrupel verursacht, die Volition des uelle von ihrem Affekt geleitet. Gemäß der Zuweisung der Funktionen von uelle une nolle in epist. 67, 2 ... könnte man sagen, dass sie um das nolle debere weiß, dass ihr aber der Affekt das uelle vorschreibt”. Hippolytus then takes up the nolle/uelle tension in his innocent question, animusne c u p i e n s aliquid effari n e q u i t? (606).
“Qui lo stupor [607] indica come il blocaggio delle facoltà psico-fisiche” (Marchetta, 2010, p. 80). The same reaction at Thy. 421-422, pigro (quid hoc est?) genitor incessu stupet / uultumque uersat seque in incerto tenet, “What is this? My father hesitates, he looks around, unsure of himself, uncertain”.
Dimoue uocis moras (587) — intrepida uerba (593) — ora (602) — uerbis (602) — uocem (603) — effari (606) — loquuntur (607) — auribus (608). The lover’s speechlessness at (e.g.) Cat. 51, 9; Verg., Aen. IV, 76. Phaedra’s loss of speech also at Ov. Her. 4.7-8 (there however to support the epistolary fiction). Loss of voice as symptom of akrasia also at Ov., Met. X, 420-422 (Myrrha).
Libet loqui pigetque (637); fugienda petimus (699). The latter at (e.g.) Cic., Ac. I, 18; Fin. I, 23; Tusc. V, 68; Hor., Sat. I, 2, 75; 3.114.
Cf. Fitch and McElduff, 2002, p. 32-35.
Miscere thalamos patris et nati apparas / uteroque prolem capere confusam impio? (171-172); remouete, famulae, purpura atque auro inlitas / uestes (387-388). Similarly the transvestite motif at Thy. 524-527, 955‑957 to externalize the victim’s fatal “conversion” from his earlier position (414-418).
Ambigua uoce uerba perplexa iacis (639).
Cf. Calabrese, 2009, p. 62-67. The semantic play is a sop to a guilty conscience, as with Ovid’s Byblis and Myrrha (Mader, 2012).
Et te merebor esse ne uiduam putes / ac tibi parentis ipse supplebo locum (632-633); o spes amantum credula, o fallax Amor! (634). As Hill, 2003, p. 167 aptly remarks, “Phaedra hears the innocuous statement as an improbable glissement between the language of politics and the language of passion, obviating the need for her to state this linkage directly”.
Est genitor in te totus (658) ; respersa nulla labe et intacta, innocens / tibi mutor uni (668-669).
Full discussion in Hill, 2003, p. 159-175.
Procul i m p u d i c o s corpore a c a s t o amoue / tactus (704-705).
On the possible sexual pun in immoriar, see Coffey and Mayer, 1990, p. 154 (ad Phae. 712).
In the play’s final act, the two strands are again separated by Phaedra herself: morere, si casta es, uiro; / si incesta, amori, “Die—if you are chaste, for your husband; if unchaste, for your love” (1184-1185). Coffey and Mayer, 1990, p. 189-190 (ad loc.) gloss: “She must die whether she is chaste or unchaste: if she is still chaste and was not raped by Hippolytus then she must die to recompense Theseus for the unnecessary loss of his son; but if she was Hippolytus’ lover then she has to die to join him below”.
Abscede, u i u e, ne quid exores (713).
See further Calabrese, 2009, p. 103-127 for discussion of the “embedded” Theseus-Hippolytus tragedy.
Theseus’ paroxysmal vow to pursue Hippolytus through every region of the world (929-941) also symmetrically inverts Phaedra’s (embryonic) “to the ends of the earth” gesture (613-616; cf. Phoen. 311‑319).
Fer abominandam nunc opem nato, parens (948).
οὔθ’ ἥδομαι τοῖσδ οὔτ’ ἐπάχθομαι κακοῖς (Hipp. 1260).
Trabert, 1953, p. 46-48; Liebermann, 1974, p. 190-193; Shelton, 1979, p. 55-56; Gill, 1987; 1996, p. 226‑239; 1997; 2006, p. 421-435; 2009, p. 66-76; Auhagen, 1999, p. 211-215.
Formally Seneca’s rhetoric of self-division, juxtaposing discordant roles and conflicting emotions (materque tota coniuge expulsa redit, Med. 28; ira pietatem fugat / iramque pietas, 943-944), builds on the Ovidian tradition: Medea torn between ratio and furor, mens and cupido (Met. VII, 10-21), Procne and Althaea between the roles of mater and soror (VI, 633; VIII, 463-464, 475, 499-500, 506-509), Myrrha between filia and amans, pudor and cupido (X, 336-340, 371-372). See further Tarrant, 1976, p. 199-200 (ad Ag. 132ff.); Stein, 2004; Nugent, 2008; Mader, 2012.
Quid, anime, cessas ? (895) ; incumbe in iras teque languentem excita (902) ; quid, anime, titubas ? (937) ; cor pepulit horror, membra torpescunt gelu / pectusque tremuit (926-927) ; ora quid lacrimae rigant ? (937) ; uariam, nunc huc ... nunc illuc, diducit, anceps, incertam, fluctus ... discordes, dubium, fluctuatur (937-944).
Et cupio et nequeo (Met. VIII, 506) ; ira, qua ducis, sequor (Med. 953). Sequor/duco: Ov., Her. 12, 209, quo fert ira, sequar. So also Tantalus’ submission to the Fury (sequor, Thy. 100) and Thyestes’ capitulation to his sons (ego uos sequor, non duco, Thy. 289); in Phoen., the “leading/following” syzygy has both literal and metaphorical meaning.
Quid nunc moraris, anime ? quid dubitas ? potens / iam cecidit ira ? paenitet facti, pudet. / quid, misera, feci ?... / ... uoluptas magna me i n u i t a m subit, / et ecce crescit (988-992) ; quam te colimus inuiti quoque ! (Phae.1116). — Medea’s self-division is mirrored in Jason’s own dilemma—si uellem
f i d e m / praestare meritis coniugis, l e t o fuit / caput offerendum, “If I wanted to keep faith with my wife as she deserves, I would have to yield up my life” (434-436)—framed as a choice between keeping faith to Medea and staying alive himself (a marriage alliance with the Corinthian royal house to shield him from Acastus, son of Pelias: 415, 521, 525-526). As he continues, the alternatives “faith to Medea/danger from Acastus” (434-436) become “faith to Medea/father-love” (non t i m o r uicit f i d e m , / sed trepida p i e t a s; quippe sequerentur necem / proles parentum, “It was not fear that prevailed over faith, but paternal anxiety”, 437-439)—and he hopes Medea too will privilege mater over coniunx: consulere natis ... quam thalamis (443). As in Medea’s monologue, Jason’s dilemma produces sharp anguish, remedia quotiens inuenit nobis deus / periculis peiora, “How often god finds us remedies worse than the dangers” (433-434): an ironically prescient lament. On Jason’s dilemma, see Heldmann, 1974, p. 175-177; Zwierlein, 2004, p. 107-112.
Hac qua r e c u s a s , qua d o l e s , ferrum exigam (1006).
Medea superest (166), Medea fiam (171), Medea nunc sum (910). Cf. Seidensticker, 1969, p. 95-97; Liebermann, 1974, p. 189; Kullmann, 1970, p. 161-164; Guastella, 2001, p. 209-210.
Liebermann, 1974, p. 162; Galimberti-Biffino, 1996.
Tu, tu malorum machinatrix facinorum, / cui feminae nequitia, ad audendum omnia / robur uirile est, nulla famae memoria, / egredere (266-269).
Nvt. Rex est timendus. Me. Rex meus fuerat pater ... (168-176); Braden, 1970, p. 20; cf. Seidensticker, 1969, p. 93-95.
Ira, qua ducis, sequor (953); ἄγου δέ μ’, ὦ Ζεῦ, καὶ σύ γ’ ἡ πεπρωμένη, / ὅποι ποθ’ ὑμῖν εἰμὶ διατεταγμένος, / ὡς ἕψομαι γ’ ἄοκνος (SVF I, 527). On the triumphant Medea nunc sum (910), Maurach, 1966, p. 137 (= Lefèvre [ed.], 1972, p. 312-313) notes: “Ihr Selbstwerden ist die Übereinstimmung mit ihrem früheren Tun, und das waren Verbrechen. Sie ist also das genaue Gegenbild zum Philosophen”; she becomes “das Bild des pervertierten Selbstgewordenseins” (p. 140). Medea as symmetrical inversion of the sapiens: Mazzoli, 1997; Lefèvre, 1997b, p. 75-78; 2000; 2002a, p. 108-109. It is significant that Medea and Atreus—albeit as grotesque travesties—are as close as we get to the Stoic sage in the dramas: Thyestes and Oedipus fail signally on these same criteria (Thy. 414-419, 442-454; Phoen. 188-196; Oed. 81-86).
Rabbow, 1954, p. 189-213; Edwards, 2008; Star, 2012, p. 23-83.
P a r i a narrentur tua / repudia thalamis (52-53); scelera te hortentur tua / et cuncta r e d e a n t (129‑130).
Erepto patre / patria atque regno (118-119); abiere Colchi ... / nihilque superest opibus e tantis tibi (164‑165); tibi patria cessit, tibi pater frater pudor (487); iam iam recepi sceptra germanum patrem, / spoliumque Colchi pecudis auratae tenent; / rediere regna, rapta uirginitas redit (982-984).
On the thematic symmetry of Medea’s revenge, where divorce answers marriage point for point (52-53, 130), see further Haß, 1997; Dupont, 2000, p. 23-25, 33-34; and especially Guastella, 2001. The latter explicates Medea’s logic of revenge by reference to Roman matrimonial exchange: Medea’s original losses (regnum, pater, frater, patria, pudor) are construed as metaphorical dowry to Jason—which she reclaims at the repudium (hac dote nupsi. redde fugienti sua, 489). Seneca’s Medea “not only expects the return of her ‘dowry’ but constructs her revenge in such a way that she can paradoxically claim that she has in fact received compensation” (Guastella, 2001, p. 208); hence her claim to have requited the earlier injuries (982-87). “If only in the logic of a paradoxical metaphor, Medea has recouped her losses; her revenge creates the illusion that ‘everything has come back’, rediere/redit (984)” (ibid., p. 216-17). Compare the analogous logic of Cassandra’s symbolic “victory” at Ag. 869-871, uicimus uicti Phryges. / bene est, r e s u r g i s Troia; traxisti iacens / pares Mycenas, terga dat uictor tuus, “We, the conquered Phrygians, have conquered! Good, Troy, you rise again. In your fall you brought to equal ruin your adversary Mycenae: your conqueror turns and runs”; with Lefèvre, 1966, p. 491-492 (= 1972, p. 469-471); Liebermann, 1974, p. 222 n. 65.
Liebermann, 1974, p. 191 ; Auhagen, 1999, p. 211 ; Zwierlein, 2004, p. 106.
Stabo et arcebo scelus (95) ; quis inferorum sede ab infausta extrahit ? (1); siste, quo praeceps ruis? (67); sequor (100).
In quod malum transcribor? (13); me pati poenas decet, / non esse poenam (86-87).
Cf. Mader, 1998, p. 38-41; Schiesaro, 2003, p. 162, “Atreus aspires to complete control over his people’s reactions, and is aware that force can turn dissent into consent, that his superior will can bend an initially uncooperative mind”; Rosati, 2011, p. 276-278. So too the enforced gaze of the unwilling spectator: mixtus in Bacchum cruor / s p e c t a n t e t e potetur, “Let blood mingled with wine be drunk while you watch” (65‑66); utinam quidem tenere fugientes deos / possem et c o a c t o s trahere, “Would that I might keep the gods from flight and forcefully drag them back” (893-894). On the quod nolunt uelint principle, Atreus “would like to treat the gods as he does his own subjects, forcing them to do what they most want to avoid” (Tarrant, 1985, p. 218 ad loc.). Cf. Med. 992-993.
On Atreus as aesthete, see (e.g.) Lefèvre, 1981; Picone, 1984, p. 51-53, 97-112; Littlewood, 2004, p. 226‑240; Mader, 2010b; Marchetta, 2010, p. 98-100, 136-138.
Resonating with arguments from Seneca’s own Clem.: Rose, 1987, p. 117-119; Mader, 1998, p. 34‑37; Manuwald, 2003; Schiesaro, 2003, p. 159-162.
Cf. Mader, 1998. Enforced complicity makes the satellite both patient and agent in the self-debasing charade—as in Tantalus’ remark me pati poenas decet, / non esse poenam (86-87), and prefiguring the dilemma of Thyestes himself.
On Atreus as inverted uir sapiens, see Monteleone, 1991, p. 361-367; Lefèvre, 1997a.
The lively inner dynamic is captured in the parallel movements from restraint to breaking free (loro tenetur – paret – pugnat – uocat / dominum morantem – seque retinenti eripit), distance to proximity (procul – praeda cum propior fuit), silence to baying (tacito ... rostro – gemitu).
Cf. Med. 866-867, frenare nescit iras / Medea, “Medea cannot reign in her feelings of anger”; Ag. 203, frena temet et siste impetus; HO 277, frena dolorem; also Herc. F. 975, compesce dementem impetum; Med. 174, compesce uerba, parce iam, demens; Phae. 404, compesce amoris impii flammas.
Self-mastery is shown also in his ability to suppress visible signs of emotion, an act requiring monumental effort; cf. Med. 155-156, leuis est dolor qui capere consilium potest / et clepere sese; magna non latitant mala; Mader, 2002, p. 339-340.
Rose, 1987, p. 123; cf. Tarrant, 1985, p. 47, 152 (ad Thy. 420).
Clarus hic regni nitor (414). Marchetta, 2010, p. 184-190 is the fullest discussion of this crucial scene.
Moueo nolentem gradum (420); pigro... incessu (421); quae causa cogit, genitor, a patria gradum / referre uisa? (429-430); perge non dubio gradu (490). At 490, the imperative perge parallels the Fury’s opening words to Tantalus, perge, detestabilis / umbra (23-24): both Tantalus and Thyestes are reluctant agents who have “to be prodded to act against [their] judgment” (Tarrant, 1985, p. 47).
O p t a t a patriae tecta ... cerno — nunc contra in m e t u s / reuoluor (404-419); clarus hic regni nitor (414). Cf. Marchetta, 2010, p. 330-334.
Hinc uetus regni furor, / illinc egestas tristis ac durus labor / quamuis rigentem tot malis [~ 417‑418, 446‑454] subigent uirum (302-304).
Animus haeret ac retro cupit / corpus referre (419-420). For animus as master over the body, cf. Clem. I, 3, 5, totum corpus animo deseruit, “the whole body is the servant of the mind”; Ep. 90, 19; 114, 23; NQ VII, 25, 2. Thyestes’ dilemma may be parsed by the nolle/uelle criteria of Phae. (above, n. 50): inhibition as rational resolve (nolle ~ bona mens) against the irrational physical urge to proceed to Argos (uelle ~ uetus regni furor). The only qualification is that the dichotomy is here not as clear-cut as in Phae.—for now both rational resolve and irrational urge are indecisive (animus haeret; nolentem gradum), this itself an indication of Thyestes’ inner division. Marchetta, 2010, p. 189 notes the analogy with hoc quod uolo / me nolle (Pha. 604‑605), but explains Thyestes’ rational nolle by reference to paranoid consciousness of his prior scelera.
Quid, anime, pendes, quidue consilium diu / tam facile torques ? (423-424) ; placet ire, pigris membra sed genibus labant / alioque quam quo nitor abductus feror (437-437). The dilemma is further nuanced by the marine simile that follows, sic concitam remige et uelo ratem / aestus resistens remigi uelo refert, “Just so a ship, urged on by oar and sail, is carried back by the tide resisting oar and sail” (438-439). Contrast Phae. 177‑185: there the simile of the sailor’s futile efforts against the waves connotes Phaedra’s ineffective resistance against irresistible desire (the illicit uelle); here (Thy. 438-439) the same image showcases Thyestes’ resistance against the inhibiting force of nolle. This inversion marks a turning point in the quod nolunt uelint dilemma. See further Marchetta, 2010, p. 187 n. 35, and 189.
Immane regnum est posse sine regno pati (470). As Tarrant, 1985, p. 155 (ad Thy. 446-470) notes, “The gusto with which Thyestes enumerates the trappings of wealth seems a clear sign that he does not find this existence as distasteful as he claims”.
Ben. VI, 43, 4, opinionem quidem et famam eo loco habeamus, tamquam non ducere, sed sequi debeat, “As for rumour and reputation, let us consider them as matters that must not guide but follow our actions”; Ep. 107, 10‑11; Vit. 15, 6.
Causam timoris ipse quam ignoro exigis. / nihil timendum uideo, sed tamen timeo (434-435).
Aygon (in this volume), following Marchetta, 2010, p. 185-207 and 299-341, argues for conscious dissimulation : “Thyeste ne veut pas dire toute la verité sur la gravité du conflit qui l’a opposé a son frère, car, en ce cas, ses fils comprendraient les dangers qui les menacent et choisiraient peut-être de s’enfuir”.
Degl’Innocenti Pierini, 2008, p. 1338-1340.
Both Atreus and Thyestes refer to themselves in the third person, as though observing themselves from outside (176-180, 937).
Thyestes’ image sed iam saeui nubila fati / pelle pointedly echoes Atreus’ gloating discutiam tibi / tenebras, miseriae sub quibus latitant tuae, “I shall dispel for you the darkness that conceals your sorrows” (896‑897): Thyestes is co-operating in his own punishment. The “tokens of bad times” here put aside include the exile’s rags that were exchanged for royal finery (524-526, 955-956), to Thyestes’ own undoing. The regal makeover does not sit comfortably; as Calder, 1983, p. 190 remarks, “The crowning of the false king (544‑546) externalizes the moral ruin of Thyestes”.
Eructat. o me caelitum excelsissimum, / regumque regem! (911-912). The art here lies in the exquisite juxtaposition of vulgar belch and elative paronomasia: cf. Schäfer, 1974, p. 11-12, 69-75; Mader, 2003.
Segal, 1984, p. 313. Cf. Shelton, 1979, p. 54, “His style is a style of rhetorical abundance, perhaps of ‘too-muchness’”.
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